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ABSTRACT Scholarly explanations of the worsening financial performance of Chinese
industry over the reform era, particularly the loss-making phenomenon, have co-
alesced around two rival stories: the “inefficient institutions causing poor financial
performance” story and the “increased competition inducing profitability decline”
story. This article critically reviews the arguments and empirical substantiation of the
two stories, and gives an alternative explanation that takes demand conditions and
industrial configurations into the analysis. On this basis, it is argued that the
worsening financial performance is a macro as well as micro problem that points to
the fundamental contradictions in contemporary Chinese political economy. Some
policy implications from this analysis are raised in the concluding section.
Chinese prime minister Zhu Rongji pledged to solve the problem of
loss-making by the country’s state-owned industrial enterprises within a
period of three years when he took up office in March 1998. The fact that
he put this as the number one task of his new administration clearly
reflects the severity of the problem. A quick glance at the relevant
statistics suffices to impress that this is the case. As is indicated in Figure
1, by 1997, total losses as a ratio of the net output of all industrial
enterprises was more than three times the ratio in 1980, increasing from
2.43 to 8.24 per cent. The increase in the incidence of loss-making is even
more alarming: almost one-fourth of all enterprises suffered from losses
by 1997, compared with the ratio of one-eighth in 1980. Table 1 further
indicates that loss-making enterprises, whilst accounting for 25–30 per
cent of the productive inputs of Chinese industry, turn out only 10 per
cent of total output. And amid keeping idle their productive inputs,
loss-making enterprises still have to pay for the amount of wages and
staff welfare costs commensurable to their input scales.1
* The draft of this article was completed during Yuk-shing Cheng’s research visit to the
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The paper has been
subsequently presented at conferences in Cambridge and Beijing. The authors wish
particularly to thank Thomas M.H. Chan for his comments on an earlier version.
1. Figures cover all township and above independently accounting industrial enterprises
(TAIAIEs). It is for these enterprises that China’s statistical authorities have published
consistent data of financial performance, and economic and technical data. The main data
series analysed in this article include those of output and losses. The authorities have published
aggregate data of net output value for all TAIAIEs for 1980–92 and those of industrial
value-added for 1992–97. The same applies to SOEs at this level. For the disaggregated,
sector-level output data, what are available are net output data for all TAIAIEs for 1980 and
1984–92 and industrial value-added data for 1992–97. Much less is available for SOEs by
industrial sectors: only net output data for 1991 and industrial value-added data for 1992–97.
As for losses, there are aggregate data for TAIAIEs and SOEs for 1980–97, as well as
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Figure 1: The Incidence and Scale of Loss-Making, 1980–1997
Sources:
State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) and
Zhongguo tongji zhaiyo (China Statistical Abstract) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe),
various issues.
The deteriorating financial performance has thus become a serious
policy concern. It is likely to damage the developmental potentials of
enterprises, and to dampen the incentive to invest in technical renovation
and upgrading for Chinese industry as a whole. These, in turn, will put
Chinese industry in a disadvantageous position in the face of market
opening and globalized competition. More immediately, against the back-
ground of East Asia’s financial and economic crisis in the closing years
of the century, the deteriorating financial performance of Chinese indus-
try has given rise to the speculation as to whether a similar crisis will
occur in the country. For, as is well known in the relevant literature, an
influential explanation of the East Asian crisis has it that the crisis
stemmed mainly from accumulated problems in the real economy –
which dragged the financial sector and thereby the macroeconomic
conditions into trouble, thus providing room for speculative attacks on the
currencies and domestic assets. In the case of China, diagnoses of the
economic conditions in this spirit were in vogue among Western media,
consultant companies and economists. It was asserted that, because of
footnote continued
sector-level data for all TAIAIEs for 1986–92 and 1995 and those for SOEs for 1986–91 and
1995. The 1995 data are from the Third Industrial Census, and hence are the most
comprehensive to date. Data about loss incidences are slightly richer than those of the scale
of losses as described above. The analysis throughout focuses on data at the level of TAIAIEs,
unless indicated otherwise. Since 1998, the authorities have ceased to publish the data for
TAIAIEs but have instead published the data for “all state-owned industrial enterprises plus
above-scale non-state-owned industrial enterprises” (quanbu guoyou ji guimoyishang
feiguoyou gongye qiye) which account for a major part of the output of all TAIAIEs.
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Table 1: Profile of Loss-Making Industrial Enterprises, 1995
(b) All Loss- (b)/(a) (b)–(a)
(a) All TAIAIEs making TAIAIEs (%) (% points)
Number of enterprises 510,381 127,920 25.06 –
Industrial value-added (million yuan) 1,544,613 157,585 10.20 –
Total capital (million yuan) 2,155,288 580,829 26.95 –
Foreign funds (million yuan) 309,626 131,099 42.34 –
Year-end net value of fixed assets (million yuan) 3,228,709 873,146 27.04 –
Year-end employment (0,000 persons) 8,576 2,468 28.78 –
Engineers and management staff (0,000 persons) 1,408 393 27.91 –
Total wage bills and staff welfare costs (million yuan) 512,268 120,714 23.56 –
Year-end liability-asset ratio (%) 65.31 76.05 – 10.74
Year-end inventory-to-total asset ratio (%) 16.76 16.17 – 0.59
Export-to-gross output ratio (%) 14.18 16.82 – 2.64
Pre-tax profit rate (%) 8.29 5.01 – 13.30
Ratio of payments for retired staff to total wage bills and welfare costs (%) 14.68 17.08 – 2.39
Ratio of retired staff to total employment (%) 16.66 20.62 – 3.96
Note:
TAIAIEs township-and-above independently accounting industrial enterprises.
Sources:
State Statistical Bureau, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 1995 nian disanci quanguo gongye pucha ziliao huibian (Data of the Third Industrial Census of the People’s
Republic of China in 1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1997), Vol. 1, pp. 46–53, 198–203.
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massive non-performing loans caused precisely by the deteriorating
financial performance of industrial enterprises, China’s state banks were
technically insolvent and the economy was on the verge of an East
Asian-type crisis. It turned out that this is a gross exaggeration. Neverthe-
less, the assertion does touch on the serious consequences of the deteriorat-
ing enterprise financial performance for China’s economy as a whole.
Hitherto, scholarly explanations of the loss-making phenomenon have
coalesced around two, essentially rival stories, namely the “inefficient
institutions causing poor financial performance” story that dismisses state
ownership as by nature incorrigible; and the “increased competition
inducing profitability decline” story about the necessary price for con-
structing a competitive, market-regulated economy.2 The unambiguous
policy conclusion of the former story is that China’s state leadership
should embrace mass privatization if the problem of loss-making, and
that of the alleged maldevelopment of the Chinese economy in general,
is to be resolved.3 An obvious difficulty with this story, however, is that
the problem of declining financial performance has in fact occurred in all
ownership sectors of Chinese industry. This implies that an ownership-
centred explanation of the observed problem is flawed, and could even be
misleading, unless one is prepared to argue that the Chinese economy as
a whole has performed badly during the reform era.
The alternative, competition-centred explanation emphasizes the ero-
sion of industrial profitability caused mainly by the massive entry of
non-state firms.4 This appears to be consistent with the observed declining
2. There are of course other explanations for the loss-making phenomenon of Chinese
industrial enterprises. Terry Sicular, for instance, contends that it might just be an accounting
artifact. Her argument is that SOEs may choose to report losses in order to obtain subsidies
from the state, even though they are actually making profits (T. Sicular, “Zhongguo de guoyou
qiye weishenme kuisun?” (“Why do Chinese state-owned enterprises make losses”), Jingji
yanjiu (Economic Research Journal), No.4 (1995), pp. 21–28). The existence of this kind of
strategic behaviour cannot be excluded. However, Chinese researchers and officials often
observe the contrary: that is, many enterprises that report positive profits are actually making
losses. Qian kui (hidden losses) are widely believed to have occurred in up to one-third of
all SOEs (Wu Jinglian, Guoyou jingji de zhanlu¨exing chongzu (Strategic Restructuring of the
State-Owned Economy) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 1998), p.2). This article does
not deal with the problem of how many enterprises are over-reporting their profits (or losses)
and how many under-reporting. It uses data at the aggregate level or at industrial sector level,
assuming that, on balance, they truly reflect the trend of changes.
3. Y. Huang, W.T. Woo and R. Duncan, “Understanding the decline of China’s state
sector,” MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, Vol.9 (1999), pp. 1–15.
Y. Cao, G. Fan and W.T. Woo, “Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future
challenges,” in W.T. Woo, S. Parker and J.D. Sachs (eds.), Economies in Transition:
Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). G. Fan and W.T.
Woo, “State enterprise reform as a source of macroeconomic instability: the case of China,”
Asian Economic Journal, Vol.10 (1996), pp. 207–224. N.R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished
Economic Revolution (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). F. Perkins, “The
costs of China’s state-owned enterprises,” MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional
Economies, Vol.9 (1999), pp. 17–33.
4. R.F. Ash and L. He, “Loss-making and the financial performance of China’s industrial
enterprises: data from the new accounting and statistical system,” Journal of Contemporary
China, Vol.7 (1998), pp. 5–20. G.H. Jefferson and T.G. Rawski, “How industrial reform
worked in China: the role of innovation, competition, and property rights,” Proceedings of
the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1994 (1995), pp. 129–156.
G.H. Jefferson, T.G. Rawski, L. Wang and Y. Zheng, “Ownership, productivity change, and
financial performance in Chinese industry,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 28
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financial performance across-the-board. Its further proposition that the
nexus of increased competition cum profitability decline has not impeded,
but rather has contributed to, the improvement in productivity of the
Chinese economy appears to be consistent with the rapid and sustained
economic growth over the past two decades. Nevertheless, as far as the
explanation of the loss-making phenomenon is concerned, this story is
also not free of difficulty. It predicts that, when profitability declines as
a result of the entries of more firms, the incidence and scale of loss-
making must go up, that is, the two trends ought to be moving in opposite
directions. However, it can be observed that, for a good part of the reform
era, there was a trend of falling industrial profit rates alongside that of
falling incidence and scale of losses. It is also observable that, moving
down to the more disaggregated level of individual industrial sectors and
especially in the 1980s, there is no clear correspondence either between
the entry of non-state firms and the decline in sectoral profit rates, or
between the profitability decline and the sectoral shares of total losses.
These suggest that the nature of competition in Chinese industry needs
to be explicitly analysed, and that there are likely to be some other,
more fundamental factors which condition the relationship between
competition and loss-making.
In this connection, a number of sector-level studies that have emerged
recently offer useful insights for further investigating into the topic. In a
study of several manufacturing industries, Peter Nolan draws attention to
a spectacular development in the 1990s: the general trend of rapid
increase in the degree of concentration in the industries, which reverses
the trend of the 1980s. The rising concentration may imply a process of
redistribution of profits among firms, a phenomenon that the competition-
centred story has ignored. Similar findings have been obtained by the
comprehensive study of six industrial branches by Jiang Xiaojuan and
associated writers, and the detailed analysis of China’s broad machinery
and electronics sector by Dic Lo and Thomas Chan – both concluding
that the increase in concentration has in fact largely improved the
efficiency and competitiveness of the industries concerned via economies
of scale. The latter two studies also both point out that the increase in
concentration has proceeded in conjunction with the slowdown in de-
mand expansion. These findings give rise to the proposition raised by
Zhang Jun that the relationship between competition and loss-making is
contingent on the extent of the market, that is, the pace of demand
expansion. Unlike the 1980s, when increased competition and
profitability decline did not lead to a worsening of loss-making because
of the general expansion of the market, the slowdown in demand expan-
footnote continued
(2000), pp. 786–813. B. Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform
1978–1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). M. Raiser, “Evaluating Chinese
industrial reforms: SOEs between output growth and profit decline,” Asian Economic Journal,
Vol.11 (1997), pp. 299–323. X. Wang, China’s Price and Enterprise Reform (Basingstoke:
Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
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sion and the increased market concentration in the 1990s have resulted in
a massive rise in the incidence and scale of loss-making.5
The limitation of these studies, however, is that the concerned proposi-
tions are essentially hypotheses in nature. Their empirical backing has
been rather limited, supported either by aggregate data or by analyses of
some specific industrial sectors. In contrast, on the basis of disaggregate
data of wide coverage and by probing into previously ignored aggregate
variables, this article seeks to offer a far more comprehensive and
coherent analysis of the loss-making phenomenon. The ambition is
explicitly to take into consideration the evolution of the sector-level
configurations, the demand-side conditions and the underlying institu-
tional factors, which combine to determine the nature of competition in
Chinese industry and the resulting loss-making phenomenon.
The article is organized in four sections. The first takes on the
“inefficient institutions causing poor financial performance” story. It
analyses the pattern of loss-making at both the aggregate and sector
levels, and the evolution of the pattern in relation to the role of govern-
ment policies and state-owned enterprises. The second section turns to the
“increased competition inducing profitability decline” story. It examines
the relationship between profit rates and the loss-making phenomenon,
again at both the aggregate and sector levels. The following section
incorporates the considerations of demand-side conditions and industrial
configurations into the analysis of the relationship between competition
and loss-making. Finally, there are some conclusions and suggested
directions for future research.
Government Policies, Institutions and Loss-Making
The “inefficient institutions causing poor financial performance” story
encompasses a range of arguments that are diverse in nature. Typical of
all these arguments, however, is the alleged asymmetry between the
decision-making autonomy granted to state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and the responsibility which they have assumed. The flaw of China’s
economic reform is thus considered to be the delay in ownership reform.6
5. P. Nolan, “Large firms and industrial reform in former planned economies: the case
of China,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.20 (1996), pp. 1–29. Jiang Xiaojuan, “Tizhi
zhuanggui yu chanye fazhan: xiangguanxing, heyixing, yiji dui zhuanggui lilun de yiyi”
(“Systemic transition and industrial development: correlation, satisfaction, and the implica-
tions for the theory of transition”), Jingji yanjiu, No. 1 (1999), pp. 35–44. D. Lo and T.M.H.
Chan, “Machinery and China’s nexus of foreign trade and economic growth,” Journal of
International Development, Vol.10 (1998), pp. 733–749. J. Zhang, “Market size, scale
economies and loss-making in China’s post-reform state manufacturing industry,”
unpublished paper, London School of Economics and Fudan University, 1998. Apart from
these studies, Chinese economists have also offered some analyses of the causes of enterprise
losses at the sector or provincial levels. One example is Fang Weizhong and Wu Jiajun (eds.),
Gongye qiye kuisun diaocha yanjiu (The Losses of Industrial Enterprises: Survey and
Research) (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1989). The analyses in this book cover the period
1978–87. A more recent book that extends its analyses to the 1990s is Zheng Haihang (ed.),
Guoyou qiye kuisun yanjiu (A Study on the Losses of State-Owned Enterprises) (Beijing: Jingji
guanli chubanshe, 1998).
6. Huang, Woo and Duncan, “Understanding the decline.”
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Nicholas Lardy claims that the high liability-to-asset ratio of enter-
prises, which as shown in Table 1 is especially pronounced among
loss-making enterprises, indicates that many of them are “value-
subtracting.” On the face of it, this judgement is dubious. It is of course
well known that the burden of interest payments arising from the high
level of indebtedness has been a major cause of loss-making. But this
does not imply that the cause of heavy indebtedness must be within the
enterprises themselves. It could well be caused by factors beyond their
control, such as the underdevelopment of the capital market, the fiscal
difficulty of the state and hence its policy of undercapitalizing SOEs, or
the underdevelopment of the social welfare system and hence the re-
sponsibility for enterprises in job security protection and welfare pro-
vision. This last point is particularly worth noting, for a further argument
from the story is that excessive expansion in labour compensation forms
another major cause of loss-making. It is apparent that this argument
simply disregards the value of job security protection and welfare pro-
vision. Loss-making enterprises could conceivably have performed better
in financial terms if not being burdened by the substantially higher-than-
average ratio of retired staff to employment and ratio of payments for
retired staff to total wage bills and welfare costs. But that better perform-
ance would in no sense imply an improvement in efficiency.7
Whatever the precise nature of its arguments, at the level of empirical
analysis, the validity of the ownership-centred story must hinge on the
alleged weaker financial performance of SOEs vis-a`-vis non-SOEs. More-
over, to argue that SOEs are by nature incorrigible, it must further show
that the weaker performance has persisted or even worsened over time.
Both of these, however, are not borne out by the available evidence.
Table 2 gives the relevant statistics. It is true that SOEs have exhibited a
higher incidence and scale of loss-making than non-SOEs. But the actual
number of loss-making SOEs has been in the range of one-fifth to
one-third of non-SOEs. And the amount of losses incurred by SOEs is 52
per cent of the total in 1997, meaning that it is only slightly larger than
that incurred by non-SOEs. More important, the relative performance of
SOEs far from deteriorated over the reform era. Its proportion of the total
7. Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (p. 49) asserts: “Although official
data show wage growth in the state sector lagging behind the growth of labor productivity
between 1978 and 1990, these data appear to understate the growth of total compensation,
that is, wages plus various subsidies and in-kind benefits. The growth of total compensation
has outstripped the growth of labor productivity, contributing to a decline in profitability.
Since 1990 this trend has worsened.” But, even if this assertion is accepted, it is still unclear
as to whether the growth is excessive because it says nothing about the levels. A better
approach would be comparing the ratio of total compensation to net output between SOEs
and non-SOEs. In 1995, for example, whilst the per worker output of SOEs is almost identical
to the average of all ownership sectors, the ratio of total wage bills (including bonus) to net
output for SOEs is 3 percentage points higher than average. The difference increases to 6
percentage points if payments for retired staff and welfare costs are included. These figures
thus seem to confirm that labour compensation in SOEs is excessive. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that even in the case of total wage bills a substantial part is used to pay for surplus
labour which, reported to be as high as 20% of total employment, is more a liability than an
asset for SOEs. Deducting (say) 10% from the total wage bills of SOEs, the ratio to net output
would then be on a par with that of average.
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Table 2: SOEs’ Shares of Total Losses and the Number of Loss-Making TAIAIEs, 1980–1997
Number of As proportion of As proportion of Losses of loss- As proportion As proportion of
loss-making the number of all all loss-making making SOEs of the NVIO of all loss-making
SOEs SOEs (%) TAIAIEs (%) (million yuan) all SOEs (%) TAIAIEs (%)
1980 12,034 19.20 29.74 3,430 2.63 88.38
1984 11,969 18.97 28.99 2,661 1.54 77.72
1985 6,749 9.59 16.71 3,244 1.59 80.10
1986 9,221 13.08 16.60 5,449 2.50 75.24
1987 9,459 12.99 15.74 6,104 2.41 72.08
1988 7,912 10.91 16.12 8,192 2.67 76.87
1989 11,785 16.03 17.66 18,019 5.21 76.99
1990 20,603 27.55 23.44 34,876 9.77 76.87
1991 19,443 25.84 24.78 36,700 9.13 77.18
1992 17,299 23.36 26.65 36,927 7.62 78.73
1993 23,209 28.80 26.76 45,264 6.66 70.85
1994 24,637 30.90 26.49 48,259 6.55 62.47
1995 29,668 33.75 23.19 63,957 8.25 53.36
1996 29,196 33.57 26.23 79,068 9.70 55.24
1997 28,433 38.22 25.70 83,095 9.69 52.36
Note:
NVIOnet value of industrial output.
Sources:
State Statistical Bureau, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 1995 nian disanci quanguo gongye pucha ziliao huibian (Data of the Third Industrial
Census of the People’s Republic of China in 1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1997), Vol. 1, pp. 46–53; State Statistical Bureau,
Zhongguo gongye jingji tongji nianjian 1998 (China Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook 1998) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999),
p. 76; Editorial Board, Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1998 (China Economic Yearbook 1998) (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji guanli chubanshe, 1999), pp.
906–907; Dic Lo, “Reappraising the performance of China’s state-owned industrial enterprises, 1980–96,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.
23 (1999), pp. 693–718.
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number of loss-making enterprises in 1997 is four percentage points less
than that in 1980, and for all the years in between the proportion is even
smaller. In terms of SOEs’ share of total losses, there is a spectacular
decrease by 36 percentage points between 1980 and 1997. This implies
non-SOEs have accounted for a steadily increasing share of total losses.
In other words, even with SOEs eliminated (privatized), the problem of
loss-making in Chinese industry would still remain very serious.8
It is, of course, important to go beyond simply engaging the owner-
ship-centred story as it stands to investigate the precise role of institutions
and government policies in the loss-making phenomenon. Relevant statis-
tical data at the disaggregated, industrial sector-level should be examined.
Table 3 shows the distribution of total losses among industrial sectors in
the years 1986, 1990 and 1995, together with the figures of what could
be called the output-adjusted loss index, that is the loss-to-output ratio of
a sector divided by the loss-to-output ratio of Chinese industry as
a whole, which is used to indicate whether a particular sector has
performed more badly than the average of Chinese industry.
Three observations can be made from the table. First, the lion’s share
of total losses has been highly concentrated in the three energy sectors of
coal mining (code 01), petroleum extraction (02) and electricity supply
(35) plus ten manufacturing industries, namely, food processing (07–08),
beverage processing (09), textile (11), chemicals (20), building materials
(25), ferrous metals smelting (26), machinery (29–30), transport equip-
ment (31), electrical equipment (32) and electronics (33). These industrial
sectors combine to account for 83 per cent of total losses in 1986, 80 per
cent in 1990 and 72 per cent in 1995. The loss-making problem is largely
a problem of these industries, which will therefore be on the focus of the
analysis below.
Secondly, the three energy industries account for a disproportionately
large share of at least 30 per cent of total losses up to 1990, but not
in 1995 where the share falls to around 10 per cent. These changes
confirm the well-known story about the artificial suppression of the
output prices of a range of upstream extraction industries by government
policy under the dual-track pricing system of the 1980s, and the ceasing
of such controls after the completion of price reform in the early 1990s.
Conversely, the continuously serious loss-making phenomenon in the
1990s could not be explained in any large measure by this government
policy.
Thirdly, the main loss-makers in the 1990s are exactly the ten manu-
facturing industries indicated above, and they in fact have persistently
made heavy losses since 1986. Their combined share of total losses
8. In terms of the output-adjusted loss index, i.e., the loss-to-output ratio of SOEs divided
by that of all enterprises, the value ranges between 1.08 and 1.10 in the years from 1980 to
1990, falling to 0.99 in 1995 and rebounding to 1.13 in 1997 (we use net output figures as
the denominator for 1980–90 and value-added figures for 1995 and 1997). There does not
appear to exist a clear trend of deteriorating performance of SOEs relative to non-SOEs in
this regard. The fact that the value of the index has exceeded one by 10% or so in most of
the years concerned could be viewed in the same light as our discussion on SOEs’ slightly
higher-than-average ratio of total wage bills to net output (see n. 7).
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Table 3: Output-Adjusted Loss Indices by Industrial Sectors, 1986, 1990, 1995
1986 1990 1995
(a) Sector (b) Sector (a) Sector (b) Sector (a) Sector (b) Sector
share in share in share in share in share in share in
NVIO (%) LoLEs (%) (b)/(a) NVIO (%) LoLEs (%) (b)/(a) NVIO (%) LoLEs (%) (b)/(a)
All industries (40 in total) 100.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
01 Coal mining & processing 3.27 30.63 9.35 3.10 16.27 5.24 3.02 2.22 0.74
02 Petroleum & natural gas 4.28 0.25 0.06 4.00 10.45 2.61 4.79 1.24 0.26
extraction
03 Ferrous metals mining & 0.28 0.17 0.59 0.25 0.12 0.49 0.23 0.33 1.41
dressing
04 Non-ferrous metals mining & 0.60 1.41 2.34 0.73 0.59 0.80 0.65 0.57 0.88
dressing
05 Building materials & other non- 0.62 1.10 1.78 0.65 0.37 0.57 0.85 0.66 0.77
metal minerals mining & dressing
06 Logging and transport of timber 1.20 0.58 0.48 1.04 0.77 0.74 0.59 0.29 0.49
and bamboo
07 Food manufacturing & 3.77 6.35 1.69 3.94 6.19 1.57 4.92 7.72 1.57
08 processing
09 Beverage manufacturing 1.78 1.99 1.12 2.27 2.86 1.26 2.47 2.85 1.15
10 Tobacco processing 4.70 0.40 0.09 5.84 1.98 0.34 4.17 0.40 0.10
11 Textile 9.54 5.61 0.59 9.67 10.21 1.06 6.49 12.00 1.85
12 Garments & other fibre products 1.77 1.80 1.01 1.98 1.06 0.53 2.50 2.48 0.99
13 Leather, furs, down & related 0.87 0.61 0.69 0.89 1.35 1.52 1.53 1.87 1.22
products
423
The
FinancialPerform
ance
ofIndustrialEnterprises
14 Timber processing, bamboo, 0.61 0.66 1.08 0.47 1.03 2.19 0.65 1.24 1.92
cane, palm & related products
15 Furniture manufacturing 0.53 0.44 0.83 0.43 0.53 1.24 0.41 0.49 1.20
16 Paper making & paper products 1.70 0.95 0.56 1.83 1.83 1.00 1.60 1.51 0.94
17 Printing & record medium 1.02 0.25 0.24 0.97 0.25 0.26 0.81 0.95 1.16
production
18 Cultural, educational & sports 0.52 0.15 0.29 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.75
goods
19 Petroleum refining, coking & 4.26 1.71 0.40 2.58 1.68 0.65 3.14 0.53 0.17
coal products
20 Raw chemical materials & 6.04 11.35 1.88 7.76 4.28 0.55 5.94 4.92 0.83
chemical products
21 Medical & pharmaceutical 1.43 0.32 0.22 1.84 0.84 0.46 1.93 1.78 0.93
products
22 Chemical fibre 1.09 0.17 0.15 1.51 0.25 0.17 1.19 1.07 0.90
23 Rubber products 1.60 0.51 0.32 1.51 0.66 0.44 0.97 0.05 0.05
24 Plastic products 1.39 1.38 0.99 1.63 1.36 0.84 1.59 0.13 0.08
25 Building materials & other non- 6.62 5.37 0.81 5.38 6.01 1.12 5.80 8.37 1.44
metal mineral products
26 Ferrous metals smelting & 6.49 0.83 0.13 6.17 2.97 0.48 6.28 4.54 0.72
pressing
27 Non-ferrous metals smelting & 1.73 0.72 0.42 1.93 1.16 0.60 1.95 1.66 0.85
pressing
28 Metal products 2.90 1.38 0.48 2.77 1.51 0.54 2.75 3.42 1.24
29 General & special purpose 11.38 9.02 0.79 9.50 10.20 1.07 7.89 7.88 1.00
30 machinery
31 Transport equipment 3.39 2.62 0.77 3.68 2.52 0.68 5.58 5.58 1.00
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Table 3: Continued
1986 1990 1995
(a) Sector (b) Sector (a) Sector (b) Sector (a) Sector (b) Sector
share in share in share in share in share in share in
NVIO (%) LoLEs (%) (b)/(a) NVIO (%) LoLEs (%) (b)/(a) NVIO (%) LoLEs (%) (b)/(a)
32 Electrical equipment & 4.05 1.34 0.33 4.12 2.20 0.53 4.48 4.20 0.94
machinery
33 Electronics & 2.27 4.57 2.01 2.87 2.03 0.71 4.58 3.84 0.84
telecommunications
34 Instruments, meters, cultural & 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.79 0.55 0.70 0.89 1.04 1.17
clerical machinery
35 Electricity power, gas & hot 4.80 2.94 0.61 4.77 3.84 0.81 5.74 6.82 1.19
water production & supply
37 Tap water production & supply 0.32 0.28 0.87 0.28 0.65 2.34 0.41 0.57 1.39
Top 5 industries combined 62.95 53.32 42.79
Top 10 industries combined 80.45 73.28 65.87
Note:
LoLEs losses of loss-making enterprises.
Sources:
As Table 1.
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increases from 49 per cent in both 1986 and 1990 to 62 per cent in 1995.
Looking at the values of the loss index, however, one can detect a
considerable degree of disparity among the industries. On one side, there
are six industries (code 20, 26, 29–30, 31, 32, 33) whose value of the loss
index either persistently stays at or below the level of one – implying that
the performance is at least on a par with the industry average – or falls
from any higher level to below one. On another side, there are four
industries (code 07–08, 09, 11, 25) whose value of the loss index either
persistently exceeds one or increases from any lower level to exceed one.
Given that these two groups of industries cannot be in any way identified
with a clear division between SOEs and non-SOEs, one cannot infer from
this disparity about the impact of ownership differences on loss-making
(in 1995, whilst the net output share of SOEs in Chinese industry as a
whole is 54 per cent, two of the six industries with the first group are with
SOEs’ share of sectoral output above 50 per cent and three of the four
industries with the second group are with the share below 50 per cent; see
Table 5 in the next section). What one can infer from the observation is
that differences across industrial sectors largely account for the capability
of enterprises, both SOEs and non-SOEs, in adjusting to cope with
loss-making.
The observation and inference made above can be to some extent
verified by explicitly examining the distribution of total losses incurred
by SOEs and non-SOEs among different industrial sectors, which are
presented in Table 4.9 To analyse the data, the industrial sectors are
divided into three groups: namely, sectors where the loss share is
significant for both SOEs and non-SOEs, sectors where it is significant
for SOEs only, and sectors where it is significant for non-SOEs only.
Sectors that fall into the first group are food processing (code 07–08),
textile (11), chemicals (20), building materials (25) and machinery (29–
30). Sectors that fall into the second group are coal mining (code 01),
petroleum extraction (02) and electricity supply (35). Sectors that can be
included in the third group are plastic products (24), metal products (28),
electrical equipment (32) and electronics (33).
From this classification emerges one significant point of difference
between SOEs and non-SOEs: the three sectors in the second group are
exactly the energy industries that belong to the planning track of China’s
price system in most of the 1980s, while those in the third group
unambiguously belonging to the market track. For sectors in the planning
track, the relative prices of their products were administratively kept low
by the government before the completion of price reform in the early
9. The intention of the sector-level analysis is not to compare the relative performance
of SOEs and non-SOEs – which should be done at the aggregate level, and has already been
(we think) settled with respect to the analysis of Table 2. Rather, the intention is to investigate
the impact of sectoral differences on loss-making of both SOEs and non-SOEs, given our prior
knowledge about these differences (dual-track pricing system, demand conditions, etc.). It is
for this reason that the analysis focuses only on the top ten loss-making sectors, including the
energy industries. Also because of this, it does not seem to matter that we analyse the sector
loss shares rather than sector output-adjusted loss indices, although it is true that a large sector
loss share is often caused by a large output share.
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Table 4: Top Ten Loss-making Industries of SOEs and Non-SOEs, 1986–1991, 1995
Sector share of losses by SOEs (%) Sector share of losses by non-SOEs (%)
1986 1987 1998 1989 1990 1991 1995 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1995
All industries (40 in total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
IND01 Coal mining & 39.5 41.8 36.2 27.8 20.7 20.5 3.4 3.1
processing
IND02 Petroleum & natural 3.3 13.9 24.0 13.6 12.7
gas extraction
IND05 Building materials & 1.8
other non-metal
minerals mining &
dressing
IND07- Food manufacturing 6.7 7.3 5.1 4.4 6.6 5.4 8.9 5.4 6.6 4.9 6.2 5.0 4.3 6.4
08 & processing
IND09 Beverage 2.9 2.7 4.3 4.4 4.8 3.6
manufacturing
IND10 Tobacco processing 2.4 3.8 5.2
IND11 Textile 3.5 3.0 2.1 2.8 8.0 10.2 12.7 12.1 12.7 13.3 14.7 17.5 20.0 11.2
IND12 Garments & other 4.7
fibre products
IND19 Petroleum refining, 2.2 2.7 3.7 2.9
coking & coal
products
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IND20 Raw chemical 13.4 3.7 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.1 4.5 5.0 4.3 4.8 5.7 5.2 4.8 5.4
materials &
chemical products
IND24 Plastic products 4.9 3.6 3.3 4.2 4.4 4.7
IND25 Building materials & 3.0 4.6 3.3 3.9 3.2 6.6 12.6 16.3 16.2 16.9 13.0 8.5 10.4
other non-metal
mineral products
IND26 Ferrous metals 3.1 2.7 5.3 2.6
smelting & pressing
IND28 Metal products 4.5 5.0 5.7 5.0 4.6 5.2 5.5
IND29- General & special 10.1 10.9 7.4 5.5 10.8 9.7 9.3 5.7 6.1 6.4 6.2 8.1 6.3 6.2
30 purpose machinery
IND31 Transport 2.5 3.3 6.3 4.8
equipment
IND32 Electrical equipment 4.1 5.6 4.6 4.2 5.7 7.0 6.0
& machinery
IND33 Electronics & 3.3 2.7 2.5 4.7 4.5
telecommunications
IND35 Electricity power, 3.6 3.7 8.3 7.4 4.9 4.4 10.6
gas & hot water
production & supply
Top 5 combined share 73.3 68.4 70.9 69.0 59.7 58.5 48.1 40.8 47.4 46.5 49.8 49.5 46.9 40.1
Sources:
As Table 2; and State Statistical Bureau, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 1995 nian disanci quanguo gongye pucha ziliao huibian (Data of the Third Industrial Census
of the People’s Republic of China in 1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1997), Vol. 2, pp. 16–168.
428 The China Quarterly
1990s. Consequently, the dual-track price system and the phased price
reform of the government also explain the much higher degree of sectoral
concentration of losses for SOEs initially and the gradual convergence of
the concentration ratio towards that of non-SOEs over time, which are
clearly indicated by the figures of top five combined share of total losses
in the table.
The industries in the first group, in which both SOEs and non-SOEs
suffered from heavy losses, were already mainly in the market track of
the price system by the late 1980s. Nevertheless, this was achieved on the
basis of earlier price de-controls. In the case of chemicals, the abrupt fall
of the share of total losses incurred by SOEs from 13 per cent in 1986 to
4 per cent in 1987 – thus converging to the level of non-SOEs – is a case
in point. As for the machinery sector, whilst the market track has been
predominant, by the late 1980s there were still segments (such as
agricultural machinery, heavy machinery and military-related equipment)
where SOEs were burdened by the government policy of artificially
suppressing output prices. Finally, the remaining three industries of the
first group have been in the market track throughout the reform era. The
losses thus appear to be mainly accounted for by structural factors
specific to the industries, particularly the problem of persistent excess
capacity which is discussed in more detail below. In other words, this
observation appears to confirm the inference made above that differences
across industries, rather than across ownership sectors, account for the
disparity in loss-making. Indeed, the persistence of heavy losses incurred
by both SOEs and non-SOEs in these industries indicates that the
industry-specific factors have simply outweighed the capability of both in
adjusting to cope with the loss-making problem.
Competition, Profitability Decline and Loss-Making
The nature of the “increased competition inducing profitability decline”
story is such that it focuses more on the process of change in China’s
enterprise development than on contrasting the various states of the
process with any notional, end-state model of the economy. In other
words, it takes an evolutionary approach, and, as such, it belongs to the
gradualist school that rivals the big bang or shock therapy school in
the broader debate over the transformation of Soviet-type economic
systems.10 At the level of empirical analysis, the motivation of the story
arises mainly from the finding about the general trend of convergence of
profit-to-capital ratios across China’s industrial sectors since the begin-
ning of the reform. In statistical terms, the standard deviation (or
coefficient of variation) of sector profit rates has tended to decrease over
time. The interpretation of this trend as being caused mainly by increased
10. Russell Smyth (“New institutional economics in the post-socialist transformation,”
Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol.12 (1998), pp. 361–398) provides a good review of the
debate. Dic Lo (“Reappraising the performance of China’s state-owned industrial enterprises,
1980–96,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.23 (1999), pp. 693–718) gives a more
China-focused account.
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competition in Chinese industry is reinforced by the further finding that
the marginal returns to productive inputs have tended to converge across
sectors and economic establishments.11
Three propositions pertaining to the story clearly reflect its nature.
These are, first, that China’s economic reform has been characterized by
the promotion of market competition, especially via the entry of non-
SOEs; secondly, that this increased competition has eroded industrial
profitability, both at the aggregate level and even more so in sectors
where non-SOEs have been the most active; and, thirdly, over time, the
pressure of competition has extended to sectors where SOEs remain
predominant, thereby resulting in the convergence of rates of return to
capital across different industrial sectors.12 These propositions largely
contradict the “inefficient institutions causing poor financial perform-
ance” story reviewed in the preceding section. In particular, the second
proposition implies that the observed profitability decline is in the main
unrelated to the existence of the state sector, while the third proposition
implies that China’s economic reform has managed to transform SOEs
into competition-responsive firms – even in sectors where the entry of
non-SOEs is limited.
Irrespective of its specific propositions, compared with the ownership-
centred story the competition-centred story is on the whole more consist-
ent with the observable fact that the levels of SOEs’ profit rates have been
very close to that of non-SOEs throughout the reform era. As can be seen
from Figure 2, it is only in recent years, since 1992 or so, that the profit
rates of SOEs have fallen below the levels of the industry average. And
the gap between the profit rates of the two has been in any case very
small. Thus, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the trend of secular
decline of China’s industrial profitability has been caused mainly by the
allegedly inefficient institutions of SOEs. The fact that the profit rate of
large-scale industrial enterprises, also shown in Figure 2, has persistently
exceeded that of the industry average by a fairly substantial margin
further contradicts the ownership-centred story. It is noted that the
majority of these enterprises are in fact SOEs; in 1997, SOEs accounted
for 74 per cent of the value-added of all large-scale TAIAIEs. They are
the core of China’s state-owned industry.
Regarding the specific propositions, the one that concerns the compe-
tition-responsiveness of SOEs is potentially very interesting but has
appeared to be significantly under-studied. It is interesting because of the
well-known fact that, in Chinese industry, the majority of non-SOEs have
been public firms of various kinds with institutions and behaviour in
11. Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan; Raiser, “Evaluating Chinese industrial reforms”;
Wang, China’s Price and Enterprise Reform. G. H. Jefferson, T.G. Rawski and Y. Zheng,
“Growth, efficiency, and convergence in China’s state and collective industry,” Economic
Development and Cultural Change, Vol.40 (1992), pp.239–266.
12. Jefferson and Rawski, “How industrial reform worked”; Naughton, Growing Out of
the Plan. G. H. Jefferson and I. Singh, “Ownership reform as a process of creative reduction
in Chinese industry,” in Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States (ed.),
China’s Economic Future: Challenges to U.S. Policy (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
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Figure 2: Pre-Tax Profit Rates, 1980–1997
Sources:
State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) and Zhongguo
tongji zhaiyao (China Statistical Abstract) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe), various issues.
significant measures resembling SOEs. Ascertaining the character of
SOEs in this regard would generate important insights for understanding
the peculiar nature of China’s economic reform as a whole. But, because
of the difficulty in tractability, available studies in the literature have not
been very revealing. The analysis by Gary Jefferson and Thomas Rawski,
for example, is typical of those studies in support of the third proposition
mentioned above by relying on subjective (and thus not really definitive)
indicators as measures of competition, such as each SOE’s estimate of the
elasticity of demand for its products or its perception of the degree of
competitive pressure from rivals.
Meanwhile, studies that are critical of the proposition have also been
problematic in measuring competition and its impact. A typical example
is Huang and Duncan, who find that, for a panel data set of 800 SOEs in
the period 1980–94, the correlation between the proportion of planned
output of enterprises and the level of profit is statistically insignificant,
while the correlation between the former variable and whether the
enterprises are making profits is significant but negative. On this basis,
the two authors claim that “the study strongly rejects the popular argu-
ment that the worsening financial performance of China’s SOEs during
the reform period was mainly due to increased competition.” But this
claim is unwarranted, because what is relevant to the competition-centred
story is the sector average profit rates – or, more precisely, changes of the
profit rates over time – rather than the profit levels or whether individual
enterprises are making profits. The fact that, in the context of China’s
dual-track pricing system which existed until the early 1990s, the planned
prices of output were depressed by the government and hence the relevant
enterprises would tend to get more revenue from a reduction in the
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proportion of planned output, further implies that this variable could
hardly serve as an indication of competition.13
It is the second proposition indicated above, concerning the correlation
between the entry of non-SOEs and profitability decline at the level of
individual industrial sectors, that has invited much work in the relevant
literature. However, this is also a topic where the empirical findings
have tended to be in conflict rather than in agreement. The conflict arises
from various sources, including the different time periods examined, the
levels of aggregation of industry concerned, and the statistics used for
measuring the degree of presence of non-SOEs.14
Nevertheless, in the context of the analysis of the main loss-making
industries listed in the previous section, there is evidence indicating that
sectors with a higher degree of presence of non-SOEs do tend to have a
lower profit rate. As can be seen from Table 5, for both 1990 and 1995
(where the relevant net output data are available), eight out of the ten
industries appear to fit with this prediction. More precisely, the eight
industries are with SOEs’ output share of the sector and the sector profit
rate either simultaneously exceeding or simultaneously being below the
average of all industries. The exceptions are food processing (code
07–08) and electrical equipment (32) in 1990, and chemicals (20) and
ferrous metals smelting (26) in 1995. Since the analysis is a cross-sec-
tional one, it is free of the controversy over the time period to be
examined. By using net output data, it also gives an indication that is
more reliable than data of gross output or fixed assets about the distri-
bution of sector-level industrial activities between SOEs and non-SOEs.
Finally, although not shown in the table, it can be verified that when
applying the analysis to Chinese industry as whole 27 out of a total of 37
sectors in 1995 appear to fit with the same prediction.
The figures in Table 5 also indicate an interesting phenomenon con-
cerning the sectoral profit rates of these main loss-making industries. In
1986, only five (code 07–08, 25, 29–30, 31 and 33) out of the ten
industries have profit rates lower than the average of all industries. This
does not fit with the prediction of the competition-centred story concern-
13. Jefferson and Rawski, “How industrial reform worked.” Y. Huang and R. Duncan,
“Did competition drive down the profitability of China’s state-owned enterprises?”
MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, Vol.9 (1999), pp. 49–60. Y.
Huang, W.T. Woo and R. Duncan, “Understanding the decline of China’s state sector,”
MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, Vol.9 (1999), pp. 1–15.
14. It is well known that the Chinese economy has undergone several cycles over the
reform era. The analysis of the correlation between entry and profit decline, both concerning
changes over time, is thus bound to be affected by the time period covered. The measurement
issue is also very difficult to resolve. Conceptually, one could use SOEs’ shares of net output
or value-added in individual industrial sectors to indicate the degree of presence of non-SOEs.
But, as mentioned in n. 1, the relevant data for years before 1991 are not available. What are
available are the gross output data which are a dubious measure for this purpose, because for
years where both data series are available the net-to-gross output ratios vary very widely
across different sectors. Jefferson and Singh, “Ownership reform,” meanwhile, draws
attention to the ambiguities concerning the economic meaning of reported measures of fixed
assets in Chinese industry. Especially in view of the substantial proportion of the so-called
“non-productive” component in the fixed assets of SOEs, it is not clear that the data could
be used for comparing their relative degree of presence in individual industrial sectors.
432
The
ChinaQuarterly
Table 5: Sectoral Profit Rates and Entry of Non-SOEs In Main Loss-Making Industries, 1986, 1990, 1995
1986 1990 1995
SOEs’ Sector Incidence SOEs’ Sector Incidence SOEs’ Sector Incidence
share profit of loss- share profit of loss- share profit of loss-
of NVIO rate making of NVIO rate making of NVIO rate making
All industries (40 industries in total) 20.43 13.16 70.07 12.20 21.07 53.78 8.29 25.06
IND07-08 Food manufacturing & processing 17.84 13.34 74.70 9.22 20.38 43.12 5.70 23.55
IND09 Beverage manufacturing 22.11 19.75 86.67 15.68 29.86 57.90 14.42 28.56
IND11 Textile 22.44 15.56 56.65 9.84 30.33 36.36 2.52 33.98
IND20 Raw chemical materials & 20.81 19.76 75.69 17.41 23.26 56.41 8.21 25.61
chemical products
IND25 Building materials & other non- 20.01 12.81 54.80 9.15 23.59 34.93 6.81 19.32
metal mineral products
IND26 Ferrous metals smelting & pressing 22.25 14.40 90.94 16.27 31.82 77.12 7.38 30.44
IND29-30 General & special purpose 15.96 9.34 65.83 6.98 18.81 44.26 5.91 24.58
machinery
IND31 Transport equipment 11.95 11.62 66.68 8.64 17.19 52.22 7.69 28.28
IND32 Electrical equipment & machinery 27.19 11.54 51.53 12.74 19.00 22.76 6.95 27.17
IND33 Electronics & telecommunications 12.81 15.32 65.11 9.75 23.44 24.62 7.94 33.54
Notes:
The 1995 NVIO figures are proxied by industrial value-added data, while the 1990 figures are calculated from GVIO data on the assumption that the NVIO-GVIO ratios
are the same as in 1991.
Sources:
As Table 4; and State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo gongye jingji tongji nianjian 1993 (China Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook 1993) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 1999), pp. 142–155; State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1991 (China Statistical Yearbook 1991) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1992),
pp. 407, 417; State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1992 (China Statistical Yearbook 1992) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1993), pp. 421, 429.
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ing the positive correlation between profitability decline and loss-making.
The situation is basically unaltered by 1990, where the number of
industries with profit rates lower than the aggregate rate increases to six
(code 11, in addition to the previous five). By 1995, however, the number
rises to nine, meaning only one (code 09) out of the ten industries is not
in line with the prediction. A similar but less pronounced trend is evident
regarding the correlation between sectoral profit rates and the incidence
of loss-making, which according to the competition-centred story should
be negative. In 1986, only three out of the ten industries fit with this
prediction. The number increases to four in 1990 and six in 1995.15
The analysis above seems to suggest that there is indeed a positive
correlation between profitability decline and loss-making at the sector
level, but that correlation is conditional on some other factors and hence
has fluctuated over time. This inference is confirmed by the trends of
industrial profit rate and the incidence and scale of loss-making at the
aggregate level. Looking at Figures 1 and 2, and from a long-term
perspective, one can see that the trends are broadly in line with the
prediction. Industrial profitability has experienced a steady decline, while
the incidence and scale of loss-making have tended to increase. Divided
into sub-periods of the reform era, however, the correlation between the
trends disappears. For the period between 1980 and 1988, for example,
whilst industrial profitability exhibits a substantial decline, the incidence
and scale of loss-making do not show a clear upward trend. Likewise, for
the period between 1990 and 1994, the loss rate and the profitability
move in the same direction (they are both falling), whereas the incidence
of loss-making shows an erratic trend. Thus, it is necessary to investigate
the possible factors that condition the relationship between profitability
decline and loss-making.
Demand Conditions, Industrial Configurations and Loss-Making
The competition-centred story emphasizes primarily the impact of an
increase in industry supply on enterprise financial performance. The
analysis, therefore, does not take into account changes in demand condi-
tions as a factor determining the performance of both the industrial sector
and the enterprises. Nor does it pay attention to the asymmetric adjust-
ment mechanism of Chinese industry. In the 1980s, along with the
15. Note that the proposition on the relationship between the degree of presence of
non-SOEs and sector profit rate, and that between sector profit rate and loss-making, both
actually concern changes over time. We apply them in a cross-sectional way in order to take
into account the broader context of the convergence tendency, i.e., the tendency for profit rates
across sectors to converge in the general environment of market-oriented reform. In other
words, under the convergence tendency, sector profit rates that initially deviated from the
average would tend to converge to the average irrespective of the degree of presence of
non-SOEs. What we want to investigate here, therefore, is a more specific issue: whether or
not sectors that have over-done the convergence tendency (i.e., with sector profit rates falling
below the average) tend to have an above-average presence of non-SOEs. Likewise, the
further issue to investigate is whether or not sectors that have over-done the convergence
tendency tend to have an above-average share of loss-making.
434 The China Quarterly
general expansion in income of most of the Chinese population, there was
a rapid growth of consumption demand which, in turn, induced a rapid
expansion of investment in most manufacturing industries. Cyclical fac-
tors have affected the demand and have in turn led to fluctuations in the
profitability and loss-making of Chinese industry (Figures 1 and 2). Yet,
the general slow down of demand expansion in the 1990s has inevitably
caused a gradual deterioration in the financial performance of China’s
industrial enterprises.
Conceptually, in a perfectly competitive market, the pressure of com-
petition normally squeezes out loss-making firms, thus reducing supply
and retaining an acceptable level of profitability. However, in the context
of China’s actual experience, whereas entry to an industry has been made
easy by economic reform, exit has been difficult. Against this back-
ground, and in conjunction with the slowdown in demand expansion,
excess production capacity has tended to grow over time. Thus, compared
with the competition-centred story as it stands, perhaps a more reasonable
and more fundamental way to show how losses of enterprises are related
to the increase in market competition is to investigate the utilization rate
of production capacity in Chinese industry. This index, by definition,
measures how much of the production equipment invested earlier is being
used to meet market demand. The lower the index, the higher the degree
of competition, no matter whether it comes from SOEs or non-SOEs. The
1995 Industrial Census reports the utilization rate of production capacity
for 112 industrial products. Of these, 53 match with the sub-classified
industries, for which financial information can be obtained.
Simple regression analysis has been applied to investigate whether the
utilization rate of production capacity explains the incidence of losses and
the loss rate. As shown in Table 6, the results indicate that the utilization
Table 6: Financial Losses and Capacity Utilization – Regression Results
Dependant variable
Loss incidence Loss rate I* Loss rate II
Independent variable
Constant 38.498 10.192 16.729
(10.523)** (8.406)** (5.369)**
Capacity utilization rate 0.166  0.087 0.112
(2.950)** ( 4.661)** ( 2.342)*
Adjusted R-square 0.129 0.265 0.0794
Number of observations 53 53 53
Notes:
Loss incidencepercentage share of enterprises that are making losses. Loss rate
1 amount of losses divided by net value of fixed assets. Loss rate II amount of losses
divided by net output value. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios, with * indicating 5%
significance and ** 1% significant.
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Figure 3: Utilization Rate of Industrial Production Capacity and
Financial Losses of Enterprises, 1995
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rate is very significant in all the three equations, in which the incidence
of losses and two different definitions of loss rates are used as the
dependent variable. The relationship can easily be seen in Figure 3, in
which the utilization rate is plotted against the dependent variables used
in the regressions.
But the analysis provides only a picture at the industrial sector level.
There is no information, for instance, about what kind of enterprises are
ascribable to the excess capacity in Chinese industry. Nor does it show
whether there are winners in this generally deteriorating market situation.
This question is important as it concerns the distribution of profits and
losses among market players and is thus related to the nature of compe-
tition in Chinese industry. As mentioned above, a variety of sector-level
studies have observed that there has been a trend of increasing market
concentration in the 1990s. Large enterprises in various product markets
have successfully restructured themselves and have been able to meet the
challenge of growing market competition. It is thus possible that they
have reaped an increasing amount (or share) of the profits, although the
industry-average profit rate has been declining.
Further breakdown information of the utilization rate of production
capacity is not available. Nevertheless, an investigation into the changes in
the profits and losses of enterprises of different sizes over time is
revealing. As shown in Table 7, in 1986, the pre-tax profit rate of large,
medium and small-scale enterprises was in the ratio of 1.25: 1.26: 1.00. It
changed to 1.42: 1.22: 1.00 in 1990. This change implies that, during the
second half of the 1980s, medium-scale enterprises were basically able to
maintain their position in market competition, although the increased
competitiveness of large-scale enterprises was already evident. The same
ratio changed further to 1.70: 1.00: 1.00 in 1997. Clearly, large-scale
enterprises established their unchallenged position in market competition
in the first half of the 1990s, resulting in the convergence of the perform-
ance of medium-scale and small-scale enterprises towards the worst.
The above figures probably only reveal how good successful large
enterprises are as compared to other successful enterprises. One may be
interested in how loss-making large enterprises compared with other
loss-making enterprises. The table shows that the loss rate (total losses of
loss-making enterprises divided by net output) of large, medium and
small-scale enterprises was 1.51, 2.34 and 3.18 per cent respectively in
1986. They all increased tremendously to reach the level of 8.61, 9.00 and
9.14 per cent respectively in 1990. This indicates that the impact of
increased competition on loss-making was relatively even across different
sizes of enterprises. However, into the 1990s, the financial performance
of large enterprises has improved a lot, while that of the other two groups
of enterprises deteriorated substantially, as indicated by their loss rates in
1995: 4.17, 11.13 and 11.01 per cent respectively. In other words, the loss
rate of large enterprises exhibits an inverted-U shape, while those for the
other two groups are basically upward sloping. This important fact may
easily be masked by some indexes such as the incidence of loss-making,
where large enterprises did not seem to have a clearly better performance.
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Table 7: Loss Rate and Incidence of Loss-Making by Enterprise Size, 1986–1997
Pre-tax profit rate (pre-tax profits Loss rate
divided by total capital) (amount of losses divided by output) Incidence of loss-making
Large Medium Small Large Medium Small Large Medium Small
enterprises enterprises enterprises enterprises enterprises enterprises enterprises enterprises enterprises
1986 22.25 22.41 17.76 1.51 2.34 3.18 9.38 8.68 13.25
1987 22.60 20.78 17.03 1.64 2.38 3.10 9.97 8.74 14.50
1988 22.12 21.55 18.50 2.24 2.54 2.64 8.81 7.88 11.75
1989 18.30 17.65 14.78 5.35 4.17 4.54 13.21 12.10 15.99
1990 14.18 12.17 9.99 8.61 9.00 9.14 23.68 25.02 20.95
1991 13.72 11.25 10.03 7.69 9.30 7.79 23.73 24.94 18.51
1992 11.15 9.64 8.59 – – – – – –
1993 11.88 9.42 8.97 – – – 21.80 25.90 19.09
1994 12.60 7.90 8.28 – – – 22.27 27.45 19.71
1995 10.57 6.19 6.22 4.17 11.13 11.01 26.75 32.16 24.80
1996 8.98 4.78 5.64 – – – 29.55 35.98 21.38
1997 8.51 4.63 5.71 – – – 32.43 38.72 22.90
Note:
In computing the loss rate, industrial value-added is used for 1995 while net value of industrial output is used in other years.
Sources:
State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) and Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao (China Statistical Abstract) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe), various issues,
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To probe further into the relationship between profitability and the
industrial structure, a cross-sectional analysis has been conducted. The
industrial configuration can be measured by the ratio of either the
four-firm market concentration or the eight-firm market concentration,
where data for 38 major industrial sectors are available for the year 1996.
As for profitability, the profit rate on assets (that is, total profits divided
by the net value of assets) and the profit rate on output (that is, total
profits divided by the gross industrial output value) are used. The
regression results, as shown in Table 8, indicate that whichever indicator
is used for profitability and for market configuration, the coefficient of
concentration ratio is highly significant. Industries having a higher con-
centration ratio tend to have a higher profitability as well.
Such a picture indicates that the nature of competition in Chinese
industry is very different from that described by the standard neoclassical
model of perfect competition, under which small and identical firms are
induced by economic profits to enter and exit the market. Rather, in
China, the force of market competition has led to a change in the market
structure and a corresponding redistribution of profits and losses among
enterprises. During such a process, a number of large enterprises have
survived as the winners. Indeed, in several product markets that have
experienced acute competition, the market concentration has become very
high. In 1997, the market share of the top ten brand names was 91.3 per
cent for washing machines, 80.5 per cent for colour television sets, 91.6
per cent for refrigerators and 81.5 per cent for VCD-players.16 In these
markets, competition is likely to have been oligopolistic in nature. How
the mode of competition will evolve in the future depends on the strategy
of enterprises as well as the government’s competition policy.
Conclusions
Three findings from the preceding empirical analyses are of note: first,
that the financial performance of SOEs has been quite close to the rest of
Chinese industry over the reform era; secondly, that, at the sector level,
there does exist a negative correlation between the degree of presence of
non-SOEs and profit rate; and, thirdly, there also exists a negative
correlation between sector profit rate and loss-making, but this has been
conditioned by the additional factors of demand expansion and industrial
configurations. These findings clearly have their implications for the main
explanations offered by the literature on the declining financial perform-
ance of Chinese industry. The first finding provides the basis for rejecting
the ownership-centred story as it stands, while the remaining two imply
that the competition-centred story contains more elements of truth but is
inadequate.
The analysis also bears policy significance. In view of the slow-down
in the growth of final consumption demand in recent years, the usual
policy conclusion of the ownership-centred story for cutting labour cost
16. Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 27 January 1998.
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Table 8: Profitability and Industrial Configuration – Regression Results, 1996
Dependent variable Dependent variable
Profit rate (1) Profit rate (2) Profit rate (1) Profit rate (2)
Independent Independent
variable variable
Constant 0.914 2.188 Constant 0.453 1.626
(0.424) (1.019) (0.200) (0.723)
C4 0.384 0.434 C8 0.296 0.337
(2.864)** (3.244)** (2.879)** (3.295)**
Adjusted R- 0.163 0.205 0.165 0.210
square
Number of 38 38 38 38
observations
Notes:
Profit rate (1) amount of pre-tax profits divided by net value of fixed assets; Profit rate (2) amount of pre-tax profits
divided by gross industrial output value. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios, with * and ** indicating 5% and 1% significance,
respectively.
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– by means of marketizing the employment system and relying on
unemployment as a labour disciplining device – is found to be misleading
in an intellectual sense and dangerous in a practical one. This will
probably further dampen the growth in consumption demand, and thereby
further increase the loss of enterprises. In other words, it will produce a
vicious circle that is difficult to get out of. In the meantime, the usual
policy conclusion of the competition-centred story for increasing market
competition under whatever circumstances is also found to be wanting,
because it tends to overlook the negative impact of the associated
profitability decline on long-term economic development. The logical
conclusion from our own analysis is that, when designing appropriate
policy to deal with the loss-making phenomenon, due account needs to be
taken of the changes in industrial configurations at the micro level and the
slowdown of demand expansion at the macro level.
